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The Role of Social and Political Action in Advancing Women’s Rights, 
Empowerment, and Accountability to Women 
Andrea Cornwall 
 
Summary  
Through the lens of four case studies focused on women’s political participation (Palestine 
and Sierra Leone), and the passage of domestic violence law (Brazil and South Africa), this 
paper looks at the role of social and political action in advancing women’s rights. In so doing, 
the paper assesses how research in fragile and conflict-affected settings might be framed to 
examine the ways in which social and political action can effect change for women in these 
contexts.  
 
The paper explores change at multiple levels: within, below and beyond the state. It 
highlights the role of women’s organisations within accountability: in both ensuring delivery 
on commitments, and tracking their subsequent effective implementation.  
 
In conclusion, the paper underlines the importance of understanding the political landscape 
in which social and political actors operate as a constantly shifting field of action, both 
contextually and temporally, in which critical junctures aligning particular strategies, tactics, 
and actors can occur to produce politically meaningful gains. It is in the learning from these 
junctures on what worked and how, that research can contribute to making positive change 
in the future. 
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1 Introduction  
In this paper I seek to frame some of the questions that might be asked of research in fragile 
and conflict-affected contexts on the contribution that social and political action can make to 
women’s rights, empowerment and accountability to women. I draw on case studies from 
diverse contexts: some classic ‘fragile states’ with all the caveats that accompany use of this 
term (Osague 2007), and some states considered to be notionally relatively well-developed 
democracies with a degree of state effectiveness that belies sectoral fragility and 
concomitant governance issues (Grindle 2007). In doing so, I move beyond the classificatory 
frame that assigns particular kinds of states to categories and opt instead for a focus on 
contexts of fragility within different political conjunctures, raising questions of governance 
that are more political than merely institutional in nature.  
 
My interest in this paper is in how change happens at a number of levels, within, below and 
beyond the state. My focus is on how commitments to women’s rights can be realised 
through empowerment and accountability, bringing the two together to explore the 
intersections between individual and collective agency in women’s empowerment, and 
between citizen voice and the responsiveness of the state or other significant institutions in 
accountability. This is because such commitments are not only seen as a locus both for 
feminist and women’s movement activism domestically, but also have a transnational and 
regional dimension in so far as legal instruments from the international arena and institutions 
at the regional and international levels come into play in advocacy strategies aimed at 
securing responsiveness and accountability on women’s rights. It is also because in some 
states, capacity for delivery is so weak or fractured by conflict and a lack of resources, the 
promotion and protection of women’s rights largely involves institutions that fall outside the 
ambit of the state.  
 
I begin with a brief review of thinking about empowerment and accountability, drawing out 
some of the principal lines that will then be picked up through the two sets of case studies. 
Both sets of case studies focus on women’s organisations and movements as social and 
political actors and each in turn takes a primary site for such action in relation to delivery on 
women’s rights commitments. The first pair look at strategies and tactics pursued by 
women’s movement social and political actors to increase the representation of women in 
political office. They draw on case study material from Palestine (Jad 2014) and Sierra 
Leone (Abdullah 2010, 2014), contexts marked by histories of conflict, state fragility and 
crisis. ‘Political empowerment’ is often reduced to the pursuit of women’s substantive 
representation, a lens that, as Mariz Tadros (2014) has so eloquently observed, occludes 
other potentially more significant avenues for political empowerment, effectiveness and 
influence. The second set of cases focus on another interface with accountability and 
empowerment: the passing and implementation of legislation on domestic violence. These 
are drawn from two of the countries with the highest levels of interpersonal conflict and 
violence in the world, Brazil (de Aquino 2009; Sardenberg 2009, 2011) and South Africa 
(Rasool 2017; Vetten 2014).  
 
 
2  Feminist perspective on empowerment and 
accountability 
‘Empowerment’ and ‘accountability’ are terms that have gained particular resonance in 
international development since the 1990s. In this section, I do three things. First, I trace 
some of the elements associated with these terms, situating them in relation to shifting 
trends in international development thinking and different domains of development 
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discourse. This, I suggest, is not simply an exercise in semantics. These are powerful 
framing terms, and a brief analysis of the ways in which they have come to be used in 
international development sheds useful light on some of the core issues with which this 
paper is concerned. Second, I draw out from this initial analysis some of the key features of 
‘empowerment’ and ‘accountability’. Third, I examine how these might or might not apply to 
understanding the nature of social and political action in pursuit of empowerment and 
accountability in fragile and conflict-affected settings. I establish in this way a set of frames 
through which to analyse the case studies that are the principal focus for the second part of 
the paper. 
 
2.1 Locating empowerment in global policy discourse  
In the global policy spaces of international development, including in those in which there is 
substantial corporate engagement – such as the World Economic Forum in Davos and 
conferences such as ‘Trust Women’ and ‘Women Deliver’ – empowerment has come to be 
associated with women and girls in general, and with their economic potential in particular. It 
has become common in these contexts for empowerment to be seen as an individual 
process in which women and girls gain ‘assets’ (money, livestock and land) and through this, 
are able to exercise ‘agency’ by ‘making choices’. These choices are assumed to be ‘good’: 
women are believed to choose to spend their resources on their children, thus reducing the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty, and contributing to social welfare as well as 
economic growth.  
 
Empowerment is commonly reduced to a narrative of ‘unleashing the potential’ of women 
and girls by facilitating their entrepreneurialism. Entrepreneurship is assumed to be 
something all women are able to pursue and succeed in; there is rarely much consideration 
of the frequency with which small businesses fail, or of risk and hazard in micro-enterprise. 
Nor is it an explicit part of the narrative – although very much an implicit driver of enthusiasm 
for women’s and girls’ empowerment – that what is being facilitated in the process is 
consumption, rather than accumulation and investment. As I suggest elsewhere (Cornwall 
2007), drawing on anthropological research with women small-scale entrepreneurs in 
southwest Nigeria, the assumptions that underlie this narrative are problematic on many 
levels. Poor women’s incomes may offer them the spending power to purchase 
commodities, pay for their children’s education and their family’s healthcare, without 
providing sufficient resources for economic autonomy, or the means to exit from unhappy or 
abusive relationships. Individual economic gain may alleviate poverty, but may offer few 
resources for systemic change that can address the underlying conditions of structural 
disadvantage. And the push for women to become entrepreneurs and seek an independent 
income has as one of its perverse consequences, as research in India (Thekkudan and 
Tandon 2009) has shown, the diversion of energies away from collective work, including 
political engagement. Empowerment thus becomes a palliative.  
 
Yet the term ‘empowerment’ has a history in international development that points to an 
altogether richer set of meanings and practices. Significantly for this paper, empowerment 
was very much part of the vocabulary of debates on alternatives to mainstream development 
in the 1970s and 1980s, in which social and political action was conceived as one of the 
most significant drivers of progressive social change. It was a term more closely associated 
with progressive social and political actors than the corporations, governments and banks 
who have come to adopt it in recent years. As used in popular education, community 
mobilisation and feminist consciousness-raising, the concept of empowerment has, since the 
1970s, spoken to and about an agenda for social transformation (Batliwala 1994; Rowlands 
1997). This involves a process of what the Brazilian social activist and radical educator 
Paulo Freire (1972) dubbed conscientização: the development of critical consciousness.  
 
8 
 
Critical consciousness arises out of a process of bringing into question aspects of our lives 
that we might up to that point have taken for granted, critically inspecting the ways in which 
inequalities are naturalised through ideologies that make it seem as if it is part of the order of 
things, for example, for women to be considered less able than men, or black people 
considered less human than white people. Conscientização is more than simply making 
people ‘aware’ or enabling people to acquire assets: it is about awakening a sense of 
indignation, denaturalising that which people might have taken as inevitable and laying bare 
the way power works to mask and maintain injustice. It involves making visible not just the 
psychological effects of privilege, but its material dimensions: the gender wage gap, the 
racial differences in incarceration and unemployment, and the differential health outcomes of 
religious and ethnic minorities. It involves unfolding layers of assumptions that have been 
sedimented over many years of school, work, social and associational life. Out of this 
process of conscientização comes an awareness of power. Empowerment, then, can be 
understood in terms of gaining a sense of power to shape the lives we want to be able to live 
ourselves, and the lives of others. 
 
2.2 Empowerment as/and political action 
The sense of power that is empowerment is as political as it is personal. Feminist 
perspectives on empowerment from the 1980s and 1990s highlighted the connections 
between the process of awakening people’s critical consciousness, seeing the injustices that 
had previously been masked, and coming together to challenge and seek to change things 
(see, for example, Batliwala 1994; Kabeer 1994; Sen 1997). Rowlands (1997) usefully 
distinguishes four dimensions of power that capture the dynamics of empowerment: power-
to, power-with, power-within, and power-over. Critical to these understandings of power, and 
to the transformative potential of empowerment, are the intersections between individual and 
collective agency.  
 
Critical consciousness-raising promotes an understanding of ourselves as human beings 
with the right to have rights. This can rest on a process through which people come to know 
themselves as subjects in their own right, who are capable of becoming something other 
than they are at present. Coming to recognise apparently unique individual experiences as 
having a common pattern rests on doing this with others, drawing threads that connect the 
individual to the collective. Marilyn Strathern (1988) uses the concept of ‘partibility’ to evoke 
the interconnectedness people feel with others, especially spouses, children and kin, to the 
point where they may experience themselves as ‘dividuals’ rather than individuals. 
Empowerment may involve a process of coming away from as well as coming together; less 
one of individualism than individuation. In the shift from ‘it’s my fate’ or ‘it’s my fault’ to 
recognising that if others are experiencing similar issues there must be something wrong 
with the norms, values, institutions and practices that everyone else seems to take for 
granted, comes a sense of shared consciousness that comes from collective engagement 
with a common project (Melucci 1989).  
 
Empowerment, then, is about much more than the individual exercise of agency. Individuals 
can acquire the psychological and material means to overcome obstacles that continue to 
affect others in similar situations. But those obstacles may remain very much in place. Over 
time, it might be argued, the sheer critical mass of individuals overcoming those obstacles 
will trample paths that others can then take much more easily. We see this, for example, in 
Bangladesh in the seismic shifts that have come about as more and more women have 
moved into paid work over the last few decades (Kabeer 2008). And yet, there are much 
more direct ways of removing those obstacles. Laws and policies that provide legal 
instruments and incentives to address discrimination on the basis of gender and create 
pathways into all kinds of work for women, including providing enabling conditions in the 
form of childcare provision, most obviously. If we look at where and why such laws and 
policies have been put in place, it is often – although not always – the case that they have 
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been contentious, and that change has required the use of ‘contentious politics’ (Tarrow 
1998). This, in turn, calls for and strengthens power-with. 
 
Reducing empowerment to making choices strips away some of its affective dimensions. A 
sense of power can extend to being able to imagine, collectively, as well as individually, new 
vistas opening up beyond current horizons (Cornwall and Edwards 2014). This can be 
exhilarating, giving people a sense of possibility as well as a sense of efficacy in being able 
to do what can be done in the here and now. The very capacity to see beyond what’s 
immediately in front of us calls for power-within, that combination of confidence, resilience 
and the ability to take risks that comes out of having some measure of power over our lives. 
To act on this may call, too, for the power-with of knowing that there are networks of support 
that can be drawn upon, that there are fall-back positions that can cushion against the risks 
of taking action (Sen 1990). Feminist and women’s organisations have a vital role to play in 
these processes of awakening indignation, mobilising for change and creating a sense of 
being ‘in movement’ (Tarrow 1998) together, and with it a safety in numbers. 
 
Thinking in these terms shifts our attention away from the kind of essentialisms associated 
with accounts of what women are – that they’re closer to nature, less corrupt than men, more 
peace-loving and all those other gender myths that became so prominent in international 
development’s justifications for investing in women in the 2000s and 2010s (Cornwall, 
Harrison and Whitehead 2007). Instead, it refocuses our attention on being a woman as a 
situation (cf. de Beauvoir 1946) that is contingent. It also usefully knocks on the head the 
assumption that women automatically have something in common with each other and 
would identify more as ‘women’ than in terms of any other identification, which we know to 
be problematic (Jonasdottir and Jones 2009; Weldon 2002). As I’ve argued elsewhere, the 
myth of female solidarity is one that remains alluring to many feminists, myself included, but 
it is patently contradicted by the reality of women’s lives (Cornwall 2007). And as Deniz 
Kandiyoti (1988, 1998) has pointed out, women may in any case have good reasons for 
vesting their commitments in oppressive patriarchal practices that make the lives of other 
women difficult; these ‘patriarchal bargains’ can be the means of their own sustenance and 
security. We need to take all this much more seriously than is often the case in the wishful 
liberal feminist attachment to gender quotas and women’s political empowerment 
programmes.  
 
It is worth reminding ourselves of this conceptual backdrop, as today’s development talk 
about empowerment seems to contain precious little appreciation of just how deep and 
difficult this process can be. Seeing empowerment as a social and political process focuses 
our attention on what works to address the very structural inequalities that produce and 
sustain those obstacles, and that can best help deal with the inevitable and ferocious 
backlash that comes from those who fear their own loss as women gain power. From this, in 
turn, comes an approach that seeks to understand and address those underlying structural 
conditions that produce such differential treatment, opportunities and outcomes for different 
kinds of people. In policy terms, it focuses our attention on what can be done, not to level the 
playing field but to rewrite the rules of the game.  
 
In international development’s policy language, this relocates the emphasis from changing 
women’s capabilities to creating an ‘enabling environment’ by tackling all forms of 
discrimination on the basis of gender (Cornwall 2016). Rather than seeing this as a separate 
and separable area of engagement, feminist social and political actors have argued that 
inequalities and injustices associated with gender are intrinsic to all other inequalities and 
injustices. There can be no justice without gender justice, no human rights without human 
rights for all. The challenges of making this a reality in conflict-affected and fragile 
governance are considerable.  
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2.3 Accountability matters 
What are the implications of all this for how we think about accountability? In work on 
accountability in international development, the focus has generally been on the state. The 
rise of accountability as a development buzzword came in the era of the promotion of ‘good 
governance’, with its focus on new public management, enhancing state capacity and 
creating effective states (Goetz and Jenkins 2005; Fox 2015). The World Bank’s flagship 
World Development Report of 1997 focused on the state, and was a landmark in defining the 
new role of the developmental state as part of a broader skein of governance arrangements 
suturing together the state, private sector institutions and civil society. The fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the velvet revolutions in Eastern Europe presaged a new era for international 
development in which technocracy came to displace politics. With it came a rise of what 
came to be termed ‘audit culture’, manifesting in the last decade in the drive for results and 
the growing prevalence of accountancy firms in the implementation of bilateral aid 
programmes.  
 
Arising out of a confluence of donor and lender enthusiasm for the promotion of 
decentralisation and civil society participation, one that rested on a series of captivating 
myths about the democratising potential of civil society (Chandhoke 2003) and the 
developmental benefits of localism (Mohan and Stokke 2000), the 2000s saw a wave of 
interest in citizen voice and citizen participation in governance (Gaventa 2004; Cornwall and 
Coelho 2007). Accountability came to be harnessed to the good governance agenda 
(Mkandawire 2007). Ensuring more efficient public administration was key to the second-
generation governance reforms that sought to create more conducive environments for 
external investment. Of particular concern to donors, lenders and investors was what the 
then president of the World Bank, Jim Wolfensohn, called the ‘cancer of development’: 
corruption.  
 
Evelina Dagnino’s (2007) insightful analysis of the conjoined trajectories of neoliberal 
governmentality and the promotion of democratisation through citizen participation highlights 
some of its inherent contradictions. Meanwhile, an exciting wave of experimentation in 
participatory governance spread new ideas about how to engage citizens, from report cards 
in which citizen input could criticise public service delivery, to citizen participation in the work 
of public administration, from budgeting to sectoral policy setting (Gaventa and McGee 2010; 
Joshi and Houtzager 2012; Fox 2015). These came to be labelled as forms of social 
accountability, in distinction from more conventional forms of political accountability.  
 
Social accountability is about improving the responsiveness of institutions both of the state 
and private or non-state institutions that affect people’s lives in any given jurisdiction as well 
as extra-territorially. It is associated with citizen engagement, and is often described in terms 
of enhancing citizen voice in order to secure responsiveness from the state and other 
authorities (Goetz and Gaventa 2001; Fox 2015). It includes: citizen monitoring and 
oversight of the conduct of state and non-state actors, such as corporations; access to 
information, including through the right to information; means of recourse and grievance, 
including through a public ombudsmen such as the Brazilian Ministerio Público; and citizen 
engagement in the allocation of public resources, such as participatory budgeting (Joshi and 
Houtzager 2012; Fox 2015). Political accountability might include the accountability of 
elected representatives to their constituencies, of elected governments to their electorates 
and of public officials to the state, and it extends to forms of fiscal accountability that include 
degrees of transparency about the use of public funds, disclosure of conflicts of interest and 
registers of benefits received by elected officials, and so on. 
 
Accountability is above all about answerability, in which institutions and those who represent 
or work for them are beholden to processes that call them to give an account of their actions 
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(Goetz and Jenkins 2005). This may be mandated by law from public or private institutions, 
although there is wide variation in the extent to which effective means of implementation 
exist to deliver on legal requirements for disclosure and redress. It may also consist in the 
voluntary adoption of norms, such as voluntary codes of conduct adopted by the corporate 
sector. The distinction between political and social accountability is useful in identifying who 
holds whom to account, and in delineating the role that citizens can play in exacting 
answerability from public and private institutions.  
 
If being accountable involves being answerable for one’s actions, the principle of 
accountability can be extended from formal to informal institutions and from collective to 
individual actors. This has been an especially powerful dimension of men’s mobilisation to 
end violence against women (Greig, Jashnani and Maccani 2015; Edström, Das and Dolan 
2014). Mobilising men to hold other men to account for their actions extends the concept of 
accountability beyond the realm of public goods and the public sphere into the domain of 
domestic and intimate lives, making private harms a matter for public concern. And it is here 
that empowerment and accountability intersect in interesting ways. Women’s empowerment 
has been noted in some settings to be met with a male backlash that typically manifests in 
increased levels of domestic violence as men seek to restrict women’s mobility and react to 
their resentment of women’s exercise of new-found economic agency and voice. This 
backlash is also reported in other spaces, from the physical and sexual harassment 
experienced by women politicians and electoral candidates, to sexual harassment and 
gender-related bullying in the workplace, to increasing levels of sexual assault on women in 
public places.  
 
Accountability is also about addressing the ways in which in many contexts the state acts to 
systematically discriminate against women, and to reinforce societal discriminations. Tom 
Carothers (2016) reminds us that what he calls the ‘gender rebalancing of states’ involves 
far more than simply adjusting the number of women in the state. It is, he argues, about 
‘gender sensitive or gender balanced forms of state functioning’ (2016: 8), which might 
include gender-responsive budgets or making systems of accountability responsive to the 
specific experiences of poor women, or ensuring through legislation that there is adequate 
investigation and action on violence against women. Looking at efforts not only to secure 
commitments from the state to women, but also at how mechanisms of accountability can be 
and have been hardwired into state functioning is a critical site for learning about what works 
to promote greater accountability to women.  
 
In what follows, I look at a series of examples from contexts in which violence and conflict is 
endemic or has been a pervasive feature of the social and political landscape. As explained 
at the outset, rather than focus on kinds of states my focus is on contexts of fragile 
governance and settings in which there is a high level of conflict and violence, even in states 
considered effective and indeed stable. 
 
 
3   Changing politics? 
With few women in politics, it’s the women who change. With many women in politics, 
politics changes.  
(Argentinian women’s movement slogan, cited by Costa 2010: 21)  
 
Women’s political representation has risen up the development agenda in the last 20 years, 
spurred by the Platform for Action (PFA) adopted at the Beijing Fourth International Women’s 
Conference in 1995 in which commitments were made by states to increase the levels of 
women’s political representation in parliaments and other kinds of national legislative 
structures to 30 per cent. Political quotas have become a widely used and well-documented 
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mechanism for fast-track increases in women’s political representation, and take a variety of 
forms depending on electoral systems (Dahlerup 2006; Ballington 2010). A range of other 
measures have been deployed to increase numbers of women running for office, and to 
seek to improve their electoral success.  
 
Tom Carothers observes how the idea that ‘women’s political equality is central to the quality 
and integrity of democratic practice and governance’ (2016: 4) has gained broad-based 
acceptance in recent years. He also points to a similarly broad recognition that the inclusion 
of women in political institutions is not something that will happen in democratising contexts 
without interventions that secure them a place, going on to note, ‘work on women’s political 
empowerment has come to represent a crucial evolutionary element of democracy support 
and development assistance more generally’ (2016: 4). I will return to the insights from his 
analysis of the challenges for women’s political empowerment in fragile and conflict-affected 
contexts later in this paper.  
 
We find in the domain of women’s political empowerment some of the most entrenched 
essentialisms in international development, with the narrow assumption prevailing that 
getting women into politics is a good thing in itself irrespective of the political platforms that 
these women represent or indeed the nature of their political constituencies (Goetz 2003; 
Tadros 2014). As we have come to see, women political leaders are not always, or even 
often, particularly keen to champion women’s rights. And those who claim to speak for 
women, in the broadest sense of the notion of representation (Pitkin 1967), may use their 
voice to advocate deeply reactionary sentiments. One of the key issues for research in this 
area, therefore, is to get beyond essentialism to look at the ways in which women’s presence 
in the political arena can contribute to the empowerment of other women and to the 
accountability of state and non-state institutions to women. As Laurel Weldon (2002) has 
pointed out, numbers of women in the legislature is in itself a poor predictor of progressive 
policies in favour of gender equality. Her research on (Weldon 2006) and her collaborative 
work with Mala Htun (Weldon and Htun 2010; Htun and Weldon 2010), based on quantitative 
analysis of large datasets, suggests that it is where there are strong, autonomous women’s 
movements that we see changes in favour of women’s rights and empowerment.  
 
How have feminist and women’s movement social and political actors fared in getting more 
women into legislative institutions, and into government? The next section contrasts two 
cases from very different settings: a post-colonial context that is still slowly emerging from a 
brutal civil war, which ended in 2002, Sierra Leone; and one a country under occupation, 
Palestine, subject to regular acts of destruction by a settler colonial power, Israel. Both have 
different political histories and political systems. Sierra Leone has a presidential multi-party 
system, with legislative power vested in a parliament. The Palestinian Authority is a semi-
presidential multi-party system with a legislative council, headed by a prime minister 
confirmed by its 132 elected representatives; 50 per cent of whom are elected through a 
proportional representation system, with the other 50 per cent elected through contests 
between individual candidates in multi-member districts.  
 
One has quotas: the Palestinian Authority, whose quota law was introduced shortly before 
the last election, in 2005, after the women’s movement organised to demand it. Sierra Leone 
does not (yet) have a quota law, but has a social movement, 50:50, who are mobilising to 
see a bill introduced in Sierra Leone’s parliament that will secure a 30 per cent quota and 
play an active role in increasing the numbers of women in political office. Levels of female 
political representation in the political institutions of these two countries are below 20 per 
cent at present, the Palestinian Authority with 13 per cent (17) women in its Legislative 
Council and Sierra Leone with 12 per cent (15) in its Parliament. In Palestine, the quota law 
stipulates that political parties must have at least one woman amongst the first three 
candidates on the list, at least one woman among the next four, and at least one woman 
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among the next five for the rest of the list; the list applies to the proportional representation 
element of the election. 
 
3.1 The ambivalent gains of electoral quotas: the Palestinian case 
After the establishment of the Palestinian Authority following the Oslo Agreement, 
Palestinian women’s rights activists were, at first, sceptical about what a quota might offer 
them, Islah Jad (2014) observes. Their view, she suggests, was that their prominence in the 
national liberation struggle would ensure their electoral success. They were wrong. The first 
legislative elections took place in 1996 with no quota in place. Only 5 women out of 88 won 
seats, a mere 5.6 per cent of elected representatives. There began the lobby for a quota. 
Fuelled by a lack of faith in political parties to field women and support their candidature, a 
coalition came together around a national campaign. It was led by the General Union of 
Palestinian Women, and included a wide range of other women’s organisations, including 
the Women’s Affairs Technical Committee, The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of 
Global Dialogue and Democracy, Miftah, and the Working Women Society (Jad 2014).  
 
Significantly, the woman who led the coalition had both political credibility and connections, 
as a senior and well-regarded member of Fateh, with a history in the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation. Her role was crucial to the success of the coalition; through her, they were 
able to secure influence with high-level political leaders, and also access to the media. 
Hamas saw the quota as a way to field women candidates who could in turn help enhance 
their political influence. Jad (2014) reports that this provided women with a political 
opportunity, which they were able to take up to shift the political agenda. She gives as an 
example what had happened to the Women’s Affairs Ministry in Gaza after the split between 
Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas retained the ministry; it was run successfully by women 
from Hamas. Jad suggests that they were able to use it to ‘shift it towards an agenda to 
defend women’s rights, using it to call for their “development”’ (2010: 85).  
 
Jad’s analysis highlights the role of women’s movements and NGOs in lending technical 
support in preparing women for political office, from training in electoral campaigning, to 
fundraising, to mobilising a constituency and dealing with the media, to leadership and 
assertiveness. These organisations also offered women a map of the landscape of 
governance institutions, including the electoral and quota laws. Yet, as is commonly the 
case, once women were elected they could call on little support in preparing themselves for 
the work of government. With all the emphasis in international development on achieving 
numerical targets for women in political institutions, attention comes to be diverted from what 
these women are actually able to do once in office. Here questions of context are crucial. 
The case of Palestine is an especially poignant one. Jad observes: 
 
The quota was enacted in a very disabling, fragmented and disempowering context. 
The election process proved to be highly divisive, and external intervention did not 
help. The deep polarisation between the PLO and Hamas had an impact on women’s 
ability to overcome political and ideological differences and work towards a common 
agenda. The divisions in political and civil society have continued to undermine, 
making public office functional, for both men and women. Furthermore, the Occupation 
and Siege have meant that in some contexts, there is no system of governance in 
place. Hence, we are left with an ironic situation in which the quota has brought 
women into a political office that is in effect dissolved of any real political power to 
implement policies and lead change. In such a context, the question becomes: What 
kind of political leadership can women exercise and how, if the mechanisms of 
enforcing decisions or initiating policies is stalled?  
(Jad 2010: 87) 
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In a situation of conflict and in a context of state fragility, efforts to promote women’s political 
participation in the formal electoral arena need to be framed against the kinds of questions 
that Jad raises. This is especially the case in contexts where national parliaments may play 
far less significant a part in affecting any area of social or economic life than other actors – 
including corporations, foreign governments and international finance agencies. This implies 
the need to sketch political empowerment initiatives onto a canvas that includes a map of the 
wider political and institutional environment. And in conflict-affected contexts, this is not a 
fixed terrain but one that is constantly changing. Capturing the elements of the conjuncture 
that impinge on women’s political engagement becomes a critically important part of such an 
analysis. 
 
3.2 Striving for political representation in Sierra Leone 
In Sierra Leone, the struggle to end the brutal and bloody civil war that raged in the country 
from 1991 to 2002 was one framed in terms of democratisation. Hussainatu Abdullah (2014) 
tells the story of the struggle within that for women’s political representation. As the war 
reached its final stages, a national conversation began to take place on gender equality. The 
women’s movement came together as a national Women’s Forum and placed demands on 
the table for equal representation at peace talks: one ignored by both sides. The fallout from 
this period produced fissures within the movement, with one part of the movement 
continuing to press for women’s inclusion in the newly forming democracy after the 1996 
elections. The 1997 coup produced a further wave of conflict.   
 
Abdullah identifies a series of phases of women’s social and political action in pursuit of 
political equality. The first, from 2000–08, consisted of the emergence of a platform for the 
demand for women’s political representation with the formation of the 50:50 Group. Together 
with other women’s groups, including the Women’s Forum and the National Organisation of 
Women, the 50:50 Group drafted the Sierra Leone Women’s Manifesto, which set out a 
broad-based legislative agenda on women’s issues. It advocated for at least a 30 per cent 
quota for women of all political and public positions, whether by election or appointment. The 
coalition failed to secure electoral quotas, but did register a success in forcing the 
government to institute a quota for Local Government Commissioners and local Ward 
Committees. The 50:50 Group turned to other tactics. A new electoral system had been 
introduced in the post-conflict political landscape, the form of electoral arrangement that is 
generally seen as the most conducive to efforts to increase women’s representation 
(Ballington 2010): proportional representation.  
 
Abdullah reports how the 50:50 Group began to lobby political parties to use what is known 
as the zipper system (alternating women and men on party lists), to place women higher up 
the party list. They also sought to engage the electorate, both through raising awareness of 
the importance of women’s participation in politics and also supporting women who came 
forward as potential candidates for office, training them in the skills needed to contest 
elections.  
 
The coalition of women parliamentarians, women NGOs and women activists in 
sustaining concerted efforts to support women’s access to political office has provided 
opportunities for political empowerment, where conventional pathways such as political 
parties have been inhibitive.  
(Abdullah 2010: 69) 
 
The 2002 election, the first parliamentary election for 34 years, and also the first post-war, 
saw larger than ever numbers of women contest. The 50:50 Group had established a cadre 
of experienced trainers, and set up branches throughout the country’s 14 districts. All parties 
placed women on their electoral lists. Abdullah reports a substantial rise from 65 contestants 
in 1996 to 156 in 2002, more than tripling the number of women in elected office from five 
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(6.2 per cent) to 18 (14.5 per cent); the number of available seats had also increased by    
50 per cent between these elections, but this still represents an appreciable improvement. 
Local government elections in 2004 brought 54 (13.7 per cent) women into positions as 
councillors, with 5.3 per cent elected as mayors or chairpersons, and 10.5 per cent as 
deputies (Abdullah 2010); many had been trained by the 50:50 Group.  
 
The struggle for a quota for women continued. Social and political actors associated with the 
50:50 Group and others in the women’s movement used every opportunity to press for the 
adoption of a quota. One such opportunity came with the Constitutional Review process. 
Carothers (2016) and others highlight the scope that post-war constitutional processes offer 
for the negotiation of new electoral arrangements: a number of post-conflict countries – 
including Iraq and Rwanda – owe part of the reason for their exceptional rates of women’s 
political participation to this. Activists sought to make use of the Constitutional Review to 
argue that increasing women’s political representation had been one of the 
recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This was rejected, on the 
grounds that those women who were calling for quotas were elites, and represented only the 
educated urban minority. What did change as a result of the review was the enabling 
electoral system, which was returned to the traditional first-past-the-post system.  
 
Sierra Leone’s political parties largely ignored advocacy for a gender-sensitive selection 
process for the next round of post-war elections in 2007 and 2008, as Abdullah recounts. 
Instead, the country was plunged into the kind of political violence that had not been seen for 
more than a decade. Women were intimidated, both as voters and as candidates. Abdullah 
reports how the women’s movement once again shifted their tactics, moving to seeking to 
ensure women’s safety, and generating financial support for women candidates who were 
running as independents after failing to win the nominations of political parties. The net result 
of the political conjuncture and the changes to the electoral system were a net drop in 
women’s representation and their participation rate as candidates, with some 16 (13.5 per 
cent) candidates being elected. At the local level, however, there was a marked increase in 
women’s candidacy, but the number elected fell well below 30 per cent at 18.9 per cent. 
 
In 2009, the Sierra Leonean ‘Campaign for Good Governance’ invited renowned 
international expert on quotas for women in politics, Drude Dahlerup, to produce a report on 
options for the introduction of quotas in Sierra Leone. Interviews with parliamentarians, 
political leaders, the Law Reform Commission, the National Human Rights Commission and 
other key national actors, along with women’s organisations convened at the national 
conference on a 30 per cent quota for women in political decision-making positions in Sierra 
Leone in December 2009, led to a set of recommendations for the design and 
implementation of a quota (Dahlerup 2010). In its preamble, the report cites the 
recommendation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that a 30 per cent quota be 
established for elected assemblies, cabinets and other political posts. The report goes on to 
invoke CEDAW, the Beijing PFA and the African Charter, drawing down on the government’s 
commitment in international intergovernmental spaces, before specifying what might be 
done in practice.  
 
By 2010, pressure was mounting for a bill advocating a 30 per cent gender quota to be put to 
Parliament. President Koroma made a public commitment to put forward such a bill in 
International Women’s Day speeches in 2010 and 2011, and the women’s movement began 
drafting the bill. Donor funding was secured to hold a national validation workshop, and the 
UN financed the establishment of the All Political Party Women’s Association, as a cross-
party alliance geared at securing the adoption of the electoral quota. This led to four of the 
main parties adopting a Gender Policy, which women were able to use as a means to secure 
a gender quota in candidates nominated for the 2012 elections (Abdullah 2014).  
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Sierra Leone still does not have a legislated or formal quota. The draft Gender Equality Bill 
was not passed. The lack of support shown by parliament’s men was in some respects 
understandable, Abdullah reflects, as some were set to lose their seats. There was 
reluctance to support the bill amongst female parliamentarians too, which extended to a lack 
of engagement with the women’s movement in either drafting or lobbying for the bill. 
Abdullah suggests that ‘deeply entrenched political party loyalty and power struggle by 
female political operatives took precedence over their collective gender interest’ (2014: 233). 
It has fallen to the government to put the Gender Equality Bill back on the table. It was 
originally a private members’ bill: it has now become a government-sponsored bill, and 
Abdullah reports that the Minister of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs ‘has 
hinged his success on the passage of the bill’ (Abdullah pers comm), an endorsement and 
political risk that will lend it a greater chance of succeeding. To this end, he established the 
‘M30 Task Force’, named after the idea of securing a 30 per cent proportion of women in 
Parliament. The task force brought together women’s organisations, members of the All 
Political Party Women’s Association and women parliamentarians. A new female Minister is 
in place and the latest word is a presidential commitment to action, in the words of President 
Koroma who declared, ‘I promise to enact the legislation on the 30 per cent quota for women 
in politics’, at the African Women’s Leadership Conference held in Sierra Leone in May 
2016. 
 
3.3 Getting traction 
A thread that runs through the experience of these very different contexts is the battle that 
women’s organisations have had to wage to get any traction on institutional measures to 
increase women’s political representation. Despite the emphasis on women’s political 
representation in a range of international instruments, agreements, goals and platforms of 
action, including CEDAW, the Beijing PFA and the Sustainable Development Goals, there 
has been staunch resistance from political parties and their political masters in both 
Palestine and Sierra Leone. Feminist and women’s movement activists have made much 
strategic use of political opportunities and alliance-building and yet have seen limited gains.  
 
Quotas for women are a clear example of a zero-sum game: for women to gain access to 
political power, some men need to cede their seats in political bodies. Achieving this through 
willing retreat is wishful at best. The struggle over the institutionalisation of a gender quota is 
therefore a struggle over a host of other things, including access to influence and resources, 
power and political space. It is also an example in which apparently technocratic and 
technical matters become of paramount political importance: the difference between an 
electoral system that is designed in such a way that women can more readily gain access to 
office to one that makes it extremely difficult for women to be allocated or to gain winnable 
seats has substantial implications.  
 
Context matters. Tom Carothers notes that the conventional repertoire of types of post-
conflict transitions is inadequate to capture the complexities of contextual differences. But, 
he goes on, there are a common set of blockages to women’s political empowerment that 
can be identified across different conflict-affected settings. The very existence of conflict in 
such settings lends itself, he notes, to ‘an overweighting of security and intelligence forces 
that are traditionally dominated by men and an underweighting of other political institutions 
that may have a higher level of representation of women’. While this is still ultimately about 
numbers, it is also an indication of some of the likely gendered dynamics in ‘state 
functioning’, especially given the prevailing culture within much if not all of the security 
sector. He goes on to point to the levels of violence directed at women, which act as a direct 
disincentive to political participation, citing a study by Pilar Domingo and Clare Cummings:  
 
Stories of women and gender activists suffering from violence aimed at discouraging 
their political participation are rife both at local and national levels… Patriarchal norms 
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within state bodies or security providers result in a failure to protect women and 
reflects high levels of complicity with perpetrators of violence or harassment against 
women.  
(Domingo and Cummings 2015: 22) 
 
Constitutional processes and the design of democratic institutions in countries emerging 
from conflict in transition to democracy can provide an entry point for reform that is simply 
not available in more settled democracies. But for this to work to support gender equality, the 
women’s movement need to be engaged in these processes and at the negotiating table, 
including in peacebuilding discussions. 
 
3.4 Beyond essentialism? 
I opened this section with a caution against the essentialisms inherent in the framing of 
women’s political representation. As Goetz and Jenkins (2016) point out, experience has 
undermined the assumption that getting more women into politics is what it takes to make 
politics more accountable to women’s rights; indeed, one only need look at countries like 
Rwanda where having a majority of women in parliament has produced regressive 
legislation. One insight emerging from these case studies is precisely the extent to which 
commonalities of interest between women cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, as Goetz 
and Jenkins (2016) point out, we see today significant mobilisation by and of women against 
gender equality. They cite Molyneux, who reflects: ‘are fascist mobilisations of women, or 
Islamist women’s movements not women’s movements in any sense?’ (2001: 45). Even if 
questions of representation are ultimately questions of equity, as Phillips (1991) has argued, 
this raises some interesting issues in relation to the role of social and political actors in 
women’s rights, empowerment and accountability to women.  
 
In these and other contexts, the kinds of alliances that might be expected between women’s 
and feminist movements and women’s civil society organisations and female 
parliamentarians are much more complex than simple questions of alignment. As we will see 
in the following example from South Africa, it may matter less how many women are in 
political office than which kinds of women in which kinds of locations in political institutions. 
This raises the important point made by Claire Annesley (2010) from her work on women in 
politics in the UK that for all the emphasis that feminists have placed on getting more women 
into power, it is access to power in the right places that drives changes in women’s rights. 
Annesley argues that increasing women’s representation in parliament may do less for 
women’s rights than increasing women’s representation in government, noting that in the 
literature, the focus has been ‘on where women have gained representation rather than 
where they actually wield political power and resources’ (2010: 51).  
 
Refocusing attention on feminist actors with political power resources and looking at how 
differently positioned actors work together to bring about change, Annesley suggests, can 
bring new insights to feminist analysis of policy and legal reform. A key finding from 
Annesley’s work is the significance of female strategic actors located in places of political 
power with access to resources, and those she calls ‘gate openers’. One question for 
research in the contexts with which this paper is concerned is the presence or absence of 
‘gate openers’; their own narratives on strategies and entry points for change are going to be 
an important source of insight.   
 
In addition, Laurel Weldon’s analysis of the impact of different modes of women’s 
representation on policies addressing violence against women in 36 democratic countries in 
1994 finds that women’s engagement in movements and in policy agencies gives women 
stronger avenues for voice in the policy process than their presence in legislatures. Indeed, 
Goetz and Jenkins (2016) point out, there has been increasing attention paid to the 
processes through which women’s groups create or join social movements and influence the 
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platforms of political parties and their legislative projects. This refocuses attention on the 
framing and influencing strategies adopted by social and political actors seeking to engage 
state accountability for women’s rights and the political opportunity structures within which 
those efforts take place (cf. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996).  
 
Turning to the final set of cases in this paper, I explore some of the dynamics of women’s 
movement efforts to put domestic violence laws into place and to hold the state to account 
for implementation in the two countries with the highest global levels of violence against 
women and girls, Brazil and South Africa. Strategically positioned feminist allies inside 
government, ‘gate openers’ with political power resources and budgets, were critical in both 
cases. As the cases show, it is in the interplay between differently located feminist 
movement actors and institutional structures that we need to look at to better understand 
social and political action that can support women’s empowerment and strengthen 
accountability. 
 
4  Accountability: monitoring and 
 mobilisation – two case studies on 
 domestic violence legislation   
 
4.1 Civil society implementation monitoring in Brazil 
Accountability is, as argued earlier, about answerability: about being able to hold those who 
have obligations to what they said they would do, and for them to be answerable for 
shortcomings, neglect and failure. It is also about ensuring the delivery of commitments that 
are made by governments as part of electoral platforms or in response to internal or external 
demands. This goes beyond the announcement of policies or the enactment of laws, 
although both are vital responses to citizen demand. It extends into implementation. Civil 
society engagement in the monitoring of implementation can be an important tool for 
accountability. My third case, from Brazil, illustrates the role that social and political action 
can play in getting laws on the statute books and ensuring that they are implemented.  
 
Social and political action leading to the adoption and implementation of the Brazilian 2006 
domestic violence act, Lei Maria da Penha offers a number of useful lessons for work in 
fragile and conflict-affected states. These include: 
 
 The scope offered by international conventions and international and regional 
human rights mechanisms as a means of leveraging a response from the state 
 The value of building capacity in jurisprudence and advocacy skills amongst 
social and political actors  
 The benefits of facilitating and supporting alliances and partnerships amongst 
those working within the state and social and political actors in civil society 
 The usefulness of transparency and communications in ensuring that the 
monitoring of implementation feeds a process of learning and improvement 
 The need to ensure sufficient resources are committed to implementation and to 
the process of monitoring implementation. 
 
The story of advocacy for and the monitoring of the implementation of Lei Maria da Penha 
formed part of the research output from the Pathways of Women’s Empowerment project, as 
documented by Silvia de Aquino (2014) and Cecilia Sardenberg (2009, 2011). For the 
purposes of this paper, I draw on elements from this story that offer lessons for other 
contexts.  
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The backdrop to the story of what remains arguably one of the most comprehensive pieces 
of domestic violence legislation in the world, is a situation in which violent conflict is part of 
the daily lives of millions of Brazilian women, and some Brazilian men. There is violence on 
the streets and especially in the poorer neighbourhoods of Brazil’s sprawling cities. And 
there is violence in many homes. Brazil has the highest incidence of female homicide 
through intimate partner violence of any country in the world. The 2013 Mapa da Violencia 
project showed a rate of 4.8 homicides per 100,000 people, some 48 times higher than the 
United States and amounting to more than 5,000 women murdered every year.  Recent 
years have seen a fall in the female homicide rate in large cities, which is widely attributed to 
the policies and legislation put in place by the Brazilian government. The reporting of 
domestic violence has improved, initially accounting for a rise in reported incidence due to 
women’s greater awareness and ability to come forward to make a complaint.  
 
A bi-yearly survey has been carried out on family and domestic violence against women by 
the Brazilian government agency DataSenado for the last 11 years.  In the most recent 
published survey of 1,102 Brazilian women, carried out in 2015, one in every five women 
reported having been beaten or abused by their current or ex-husband, partner or lover, and 
26 per cent of those women still live with their abuser. Almost 100 per cent of those 
surveyed were aware of the 2006 domestic violence law. The survey also found a perceived 
increase in violence: some 63 per cent of respondents thought that family and domestic 
violence was on the increase, 23 per cent felt it had stayed the same and 13 per cent that it 
had diminished. Physical violence constituted the majority of reported incidents, but there 
was an increase in psychological violence from 2013 to 2015 of ten percentage points to     
48 per cent of incidents, along with a slight reduction in bullying, from 39 per cent in 2013 to 
31 per cent in 2015. It is interesting to note that almost 30 per cent of those who had 
suffered at least one incident of violence reported it to the police, either to a general police 
station (27 per cent) or to a dedicated women’s police station (11 per cent). 
 
What has the role of social and political action been in securing the improvements that are 
slowly being seen as the Lei Maria da Penha takes effect? And what can be learnt for work 
in fragile and conflict-affected contexts? Advocacy for improvements to Brazil’s legislation so 
as to address the widespread incidence of family and domestic violence goes back more 
than three decades. Feminist social and political actors have mobilised and sought 
responsiveness from the state through demonstrations, petitions and other forms of social 
and political action since the 1970s to protest rulings that judged in favour of men charged 
with femicide who claimed ‘legitimate defence of honour’ (Sardenberg 2011). It was not until 
the early 2000s, however, that they were able to gain any traction. It took recourse to a 
regional human rights body for the Brazilian government to act (cf. Keck and Sikkink 1998).  
 
In the mid-1980s, Brazil’s feminist and women’s movements pressed for and secured the 
creation of women’s police stations – Delegacias Especializadas de Atendimento a Mulher, 
commonly known as delegacias da mulher – that would serve the policing of violence 
against women. Since then, women’s police stations or other specialised units have been set 
up in 447 cities across Brazil. Sardenberg (2011) notes considerable variation between 
these units. Some are solely police units. Others offer mediation and other more preventive 
services. Some work only on domestic or family violence, others on all gender-related crime 
against women.  
 
What helped to spur the government into action was not domestic protest and petition, but 
being held to account by the regional human rights body, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, to whom a claim had been taken by a group of Brazilian feminist lawyers 
representing a woman, Maria da Penha Fernandes, whose husband had beaten her so 
severely in a homicide attempt in 1983, that she was left paraplegic. Maria da Penha took 
him to court, but it took seven years to find him guilty. He was sentenced to 15 years, but an 
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appeal saw the conviction quashed. In 1996, he was tried again, and given ten years in 
prison. But he remained free. In 1998, Maria da Penha took the case to the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights. Two feminist legal institutions prepared her case, the Centre for 
Justice and International Law (CEJIL) and the Latin American and Caribbean Committee for 
the Defence of Women’s Rights (CLADEM).  
 
The petition addressed Brazil’s obligations under the Convention of Belém do Pará, the 
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
against Women, which had been ratified by Brazil in November 1995. With similar provision 
to CEDAW, the Belém do Pará Convention includes a definition of violence against women 
and holds the state responsible for protecting women from violence, including the translation 
of this responsibility into concrete preventative actions and guaranteeing adequate 
resources for punitive action against aggressors and compensation of victims (de Aquino 
2014). In 2001, Brazil was found responsible for violating the right to a fair trial and judicial 
protection, under Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights, together 
with a failure to observe rights set out in Article 1, on account of the time it had taken to 
address the case of domestic violence. Brazil was also found negligent under Article 7 of the 
Convention of Bélem do Pará, in particular the right to live a life free of violence, and for the 
state’s failure to adequately address violence against women in general, and in particular for 
the failure of the police and judiciary to take action. The Commission noted: 
 
The violation against Maria da Penha is part of a general pattern of negligence and 
lack of efficiency on the part of the state in terms of processing and sentencing 
aggressors… [T]his lack of general judicial efficiency in combination with 
discriminatory practice help create the very environment that allows the existence of 
domestic violence, as there is no socially perceived evidence of the will and 
effectiveness on the part of the state, as a representative of society, to punish acts of 
this type.  
(Organizaçao dos Estados Americanos 2001: 13, cited in de Aquino 2014: 179) 
 
Recommendations were set out in some detail. They included changes to the ways in which 
investigations were to be carried out, training of specialist judicial and police officers, 
symbolic and material redress for the victim, reformulating judicial procedures to make them 
simpler, promoting alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for family conflicts, increasing 
the number of women’s police stations and promoting pedagogic interventions and curricula 
that would enhance respect for women’s rights, and enhance women’s awareness of the 
rights they had under the Convention of Bélem do Pará.  It was the first time that the Belém 
do Pará Convention had been applied and that a country had been found to be responsible 
for domestic violence under its provisions. It took a further five years for the Lei Maria da 
Penha to become law.  
 
From 2002 to 2004, a consortium of feminist advocacy organisations came together to draft 
legislation that would address domestic violence and violence against women. They included 
some of Brazil’s leading feminist civil society organisations with considerable advocacy 
experience and expertise in the legal domain, such as Themis, CLADEM, Cepia and 
CFEMEA. In 2003, the Workers’ Party administration of Lula da Silva took power, and put in 
place a Special Secretariat of Public Policies for Women (SPM). The SPM played a role in 
coordinating a working group that brought the consortium and a range of ministries together, 
and in facilitating public audiences all over the country at which the draft legislation was 
discussed. In late 2004, the outcome of this process was presented to Congress; it took two 
more years of lobbying by feminist and women’s movements for the law to be passed 
(Sardenberg 2011).  
 
The next struggle was for implementation. Brazil is a huge country. The SPM is spread thin, 
operating in the more populous areas, with limited reach in some parts of the country and 
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especially in the rural areas. Making the law operational was a huge challenge, not least 
because of the resistance that the law generated. The SPM sought to strengthen the 
implementation process by putting out a tender for a consortium of civil society organisations 
who could monitor the implementation of the law throughout the country’s 26 states, feeding 
back to the SPM and providing a source of pressure – and potentially accountability – at the 
local level. The Observatory for Monitoring the Implementation of Lei Maria da Penha 
(OBSERVE) was formed in 2009. It set about designing a methodology that could be used 
for monitoring the law. The consortium carried out surveys at police stations and special 
courts for domestic and family violence, and produced case studies that document good 
practice in cross-agency coordination (Sardenberg 2011). 
 
Much of the challenge of implementation lies in raising awareness of the provisions of the 
law, amongst service providers and amongst women. The findings of the recent DataSenado 
survey suggest that the promotional campaigns and awareness-raising activities that have 
been carried out by state and civil society organisations alike have been very successful. Yet 
challenges still remain in relation to those administering the law, especially in the judiciary. 
And, Sardenberg (2011) observes, shortcomings continue to exist in the provision of 
services by the agencies concerned, noting their lack of a ‘culture of accountability’.  
 
The Brazilian experience has elements that may not translate to other countries: it is, for 
example, a context where the state is better resourced and more extensive in its provision of 
services, and where citizens may have more confidence in the capacity of the police to take 
their claims seriously and assist them in pursuing them. These are core features of 
governance quality in Brazil that distinguish it from a fragile or conflict-affected situation. Yet, 
if we include in our consideration of governance quality the state of hostility and conflict 
between women and men, and systemic failures of state responsiveness to women, there 
are insights here for other countries. Indeed, there are elements here that are not so 
dissimilar to other countries. In practice, for example, in Brazil as in many countries, civil 
society organisations may find themselves carrying much of the responsibility for service 
provision in areas such as violence against women and reproductive health. This also needs 
to be seen as a governance failure, and as evidence of weak or fragile governance.  
 
What the Brazilian experience offers that is also useful to other contexts is an example of 
partnership working across state and civil society to pursue common ends, and the role that 
can be played by the state in facilitating efforts to enhance accountability as part of that 
process. Domestic and family violence legislation exists in most countries, even if the 
formulation of laws is not as sophisticated or comprehensive as in Brazil. Civil society 
monitoring can be a way in which social and political action can continue beyond popular 
pressure to put laws in place to insisting on adherence to the provisions made within them, 
holding the police and judiciary to account. This illustrates how much can and should be 
done to push for state accountability through the systematic collection of data at the frontline 
of service delivery, in order to make visible some of the shortcomings of practice. Where 
states lack capacity and where there is expertise and experience in civil society, or indeed 
also reach that is beyond the capacity of the state, partnership working of this kind to 
enhance monitoring of implementation and strengthen accountability can provide the basis 
for states to be more responsive (Cornwall, Pasteur and Lucas 2000). 
 
4.2 Accountability through mobilisation in South Africa 
South Africa is another state in which there is endemic violence against women and horrific 
levels of rape and other forms of sexual assault. As such, it is also a context in which conflict 
is part of the fabric of everyday life for many South Africans, especially those who live in low-
income neighbourhoods. Against this backdrop, South African domestic violence legislation 
has been developed to contend not only with high prevalence of violence, but also with the 
patriarchal attitudes of the police and judiciary. As Shahana Rasool (forthcoming) observes, 
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domestic violence legislation also needs to be understood in the context of South Africa’s 
history of racism and oppression by the state.  
 
The South African Domestic Violence Act (DVA) was an outcome of feminist and women’s 
movement organising to put domestic violence on the public policy agenda, transforming 
what was widely thought to be a ‘private’ matter into an issue of public concern. Rasool 
(forthcoming) highlights the role women’s organising played in getting the DVA on the statute 
books. She explores within this two themes with wider relevance to states in which efforts 
are being made to expand the political representation of women, as in the examples earlier 
in this paper. The first is influence over the shaping of policy, and the second is over the 
influence that women are able to have in the legislative process as a result of increased 
representation of women as elected representatives.  
 
As in other countries, an important part of this influence came to be exerted through a 
coalition of women’s and other organisations that came together to advocate for reform, the 
National Network on Violence against Women (NNVAW). This was an outcome of a process 
that began with a joint conference between government and NGOs held once the ANC 
assumed power in 1994. This resulted in the establishment of an Interim Desk on Violence 
Against Women, and the formation of the NNVAW (Rasool, forthcoming; Meintjes 2003). It 
brought together many of the main NGOs working on VAW, including POWA, NISAA, 
WAWA, ADAPT, CSVR and representatives of government. The NNVAW mobilised 
research to influence the policy process, and played an active role in lobbying government to 
put into place legislation on domestic violence.  
 
As Meintjes (2003) observes, civil society organisations had been putting pressure on 
government for more than two decades prior to the passing of the DVA. It took the 
enactment of a new constitution for South Africa to create the policy space for VAW to be 
placed on the agenda, first via the contested 1993 Prevention of Family Violence Act – in 
which there was little civil society participation – and subsequently in the substantive 
measures that came with the passing of the 1998 DVA (Rasool, forthcoming; Meintjes 2003). 
Advocates within the legislative arena played an important part in advancing the argument. 
They included the Deputy Justice Minister, Dr Manto Tashabalala-Msimang, who went on to 
champion a high-level public awareness campaign aimed at Department of Justice staff, and 
MPs such as Pregs Govender, who organised public hearings on VAW, engaged the ANC 
women’s caucus and liaised with key male allies to ensure parliamentary debate for the Bill 
(Rasool, forthcoming). Rasool observes that what made the difference was women in 
strategic places within the bureaucracy – what Clare Annesley (2010) has referred to as 
‘gate openers’ – and strategic partnerships with supportive male allies.  
 
The South African women’s movement were also able to make use of an international 
instrument, reporting obligations under the Convention on All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), via the practice of shadow reports written by NGOs. It was 
pressure brought by a shadow report exposing the deep failures of the South African 
Government to address violence against women that had been one of the spurs behind the 
1993 Family Violence Act, and that came to pave the way for the more extensive legislation 
that followed in 1998 (Rasool, forthcoming; Meintjes 2003).  
 
Putting a law on the statute books is a different kind of struggle to that of making it effective, 
and in the South African case, a whole new set of challenges arose when it came to 
securing the resources and institutional commitment to implementation. In a telling excerpt 
from a 1994 submission to the Police Board, Lisa Vetten (2014: 1) reveals the scale of the 
challenge: 
 
It is a world-wide belief that the police should not interfere or get involved in household 
disputes. The rationale behind this relates to law enforcement as the primary function 
23 
 
of the police – and law can only be enforced when someone lodges a criminal 
complaint with the police. Once they get involved in household disputes, the police are 
blamed for interfering in private matters. The priorities of policing are determined by 
the community. Figures of other serious crimes reported to the SAP [South African 
Police] confirm this fact. More attention has to be devoted to those serious crimes, 
which are more frequently reported.1 
 
Legislators’ response in the DVA was, Vetten notes, to prescribe duties for the policing of 
domestic violence and the establishment of an accountability structure that would make 
visible and punish non-compliance. For all that this sought to create mechanisms that could 
drive police compliance, Vetten details a litany of shortcomings and outlines the widespread 
failure to comply with the requirements of the Act. She goes on to look at the effect that 
political accountability had on the implementation of the DVA. As in Brazil, feminist and 
women’s organisations played a key role in this. What emerges from the South African case 
is, again, a story of working in alliances and partnership that sought to bring to bear pressure 
on the police to hold them to account. What’s especially interesting about this story is the 
way in which gender interests cut across vertical and horizontal accountability structures to 
create opportunities for diagonal accountability, and the lessons it offers about the 
engagement of women’s movements in sustaining legislative or policy gains.  
 
Part of the accountability structures put in place by the DVA involved monitoring 
implementation, through the collection of data on compliance with statutory obligations from 
police stations and analysis of complaints against the police for non-compliance with their 
obligations in relation to dealing with perpetrators and victims. The scale of non-compliance, 
and the rising tide of complaints against police that began to surface spurred civil society to 
press for accountability. Vetten describes how the Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre 
took action in 2006, serving papers announcing their intention to ask the court for an order 
that would compel the police to fulfil their obligations to report. The threat of legal action 
worked and it was held over the police service as pending should they not submit reports 
within a given period. Within a couple of years, further pressure was being brought to bear 
on the South African Police Service. In the meanwhile, legislative changes undermined the 
DVA; critically removing a section that required the police to comply with instructions and the 
obligation for the policy to account in public for non-compliance. This generated protest from 
civil society organisations, expressed in the form of a petition signed by 17 organisations, 
and submitted to the Police Portfolio Committee. The South African Human Rights 
Commission also prepared a submission, expressing similar concerns.  
 
The Bill was redrafted. Vetten (2014) reports that a workshop took place in which the Civilian 
Secretariat for the Police (CSP) and women’s organisations discussed how mechanisms for 
oversight might best be drawn up, which led to the creation of a civil society reference group 
that would meet quarterly with the CSP to discuss issues relating to women and children. 
But the new Act, Vetten points out, failed to address two important avenues for 
accountability: the loss of an avenue of complaint and the lack of means to enforce 
recommendations. The Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) set up in 1995 was 
modified with the 2011 changes to a weaker body, the Independent Police Investigative 
Directorate (IPID); this involved shifting the DVA-related aspects of the ICD to the IPID, 
which, as Vetten points out, ‘did away with an avenue of complaint’ (2014: 3). Other means 
needed to be sought to enforce recommendations.  
 
Women’s organisations intervened again in September 2011, when three organisations – the 
Gender, Health and Justice Research Unit, TLAC and the Limpopo Legal Advice Centre – 
were asked to address the Police Portfolio Committee on the topic of policing domestic 
violence. The police sustained severe criticism, Vetten narrates, in these proceedings.     
                                                 
1  Vetten (2014: 1) cites Olckers (1997: 131) as the source. 
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But, she suggests, it was this public humiliation that spurred senior police management to 
take action. Instructions were circulated to all police stations, performance indicators were 
put in place for Provincial Commissioners, training targets were set and by 2012, a national 
strategy had begun to be developed around the DVA. Vetten cites the South African Police 
Service’s Annual Performance Plan for 2013/14, in which evidence can be found of a greater 
focus on training on the policing of violence against women: it was the fifth largest 
programme, with some 460 courses planned and a target audience of 6,500 police officers. 
As Vetten notes, political accountability – through parliament and vocal civil society 
organisations – worked to embarrass the police into action. She goes on to suggest: 
 
… while legislating accountability may [set] the minimum condition for its practice, it is 
not sufficient. Nor do institutions, by the mere fact of their existence, compel 
accountability either… it was the increasing practice of political accountability between 
2007 and 2013 that eventually converted a set of oversight mechanisms into an 
accountability structure. As SAPS was increasingly compelled to answer for the 
implementation of the DVA, a more substantive notion of accountability came into 
being, one which resulted in greater responsiveness, transparency and liability.  
(Vetten 2014: 8) 
 
Women’s organisations played what Vetten describes as a ‘catalytic’ role in this process. 
And yet much came to depend on factors such as the responsiveness of the Police Portfolio 
Committee, which in turn depended on its leadership. Vetten describes how between 2004 
and 2009, the Committee failed to invite any representations from civil society. With the 
appointment of subsequent committee chairs, in 2009 and 2014 respectively, this position 
shifted. That both chairs were women may have had something to do with this. Vetten 
speaks of ‘diagonal accountability at work’ (2014: 8), where organisations were given an 
opportunity to present accounts of the policing of the DVA that departed from those given by 
the police themselves, and thus be given a space by the committee to hold the police to 
account. Vetten draws from this the important point that to influence parliamentary structures 
it is not just access to decision-making bodies that matters, women’s organisations also 
need to understand what kind of information parliamentarians need and how to best provide 
them with it.  
 
Laurel Weldon and Mala Htun’s (2010) quantitative analysis of domestic violence legislation 
highlights the key role played by women’s movements internationally in putting domestic 
violence on the policy agenda, lobbying for legislation and holding states to account for non-
compliance and sluggish or lacklustre implementation. One of their key findings is that for 
women’s movements to be effective, they need to be as autonomous as possible from the 
state: only then are they able to hold the state to account without fear of reprisal or financial 
sanctions. Htun and Weldon (2010) also say that women’s movements need to be 
autonomous from other types of civil society organisations that might co-opt women’s 
movements and postpone their goals. The period around and shortly after South Africa’s  
independence in 1994 was a high point in the history of the South African women’s 
movement. Women’s organisations gained a voice in the Constitutional process, ensuring 
key provisions were put in place to support gender equality, and played a part in the 
establishment of an institutional structure within the state charged with delivery of 
commitments to gender equality (Fester 2014). Goetz and Hassim’s (2003) No Shortcuts to 
Power captures the intensity of the struggle for change, and the tenacity of the women’s 
movement.  
 
Fast forward 20 years and the women’s movement is a shadow of its earlier self, fast losing 
ground. This is in part due to chronic underfunding. It is also due to co-optation into 
government, and clashes with the ANC which is shrinking civil society space for critical 
social movements. This weakening of women’s organised engagement in social and political 
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action raises a number of challenges in relation to addressing violence that are echoed in 
many other contexts, including fragile and conflict-affected settings. Rasool observes: 
 
In South Africa, the ability of individuals and groups to be critical of the government is 
already in jeopardy because of political, legal and financial repercussion individuals or 
groups have faced when challenging key state policies. Non-government 
organisations, such as many of the organisations that constituted the NNVAW who 
historically were powerful lobbying tools of the state, are now compromised by their 
financial dependence on the State since international donor funding that used to go 
directly to NGOs now is directed via government. Hence the ability of the women’s 
movement to transform gender relations in South Africa as well as their ability to 
develop meaningful policies to effect political, economic and social change for 
women… is increasingly being threatened with many becoming dependent on 
government funds because of the withdrawal of foreign donors.  
(Rasool, forthcoming) 
 
The current conjuncture in South Africa is one in which earlier gains in progressive 
legislation and statutory mechanisms are being unwound, at the same time as levels of 
gender and all other forms of violence persist unabated. In South Africa, women’s 
organisations are one arm of the women’s movements; the other is the women’s wing of the 
political parties, which has also found itself compromised in recent years, diminishing its 
capacity to hold the state to account for its commitments on violence against women. This 
illustrates the broader point that for all the laws, mechanisms and structures that can be put 
in place in a period of reform, it is nigh impossible to insulate the apparatus of the state from 
the influence of the executive. The very fact that progress has been made on violence 
against women in this political context is testament to the much longer back-story of 
mobilisation over many years, and the long hard struggle to get violence against women 
onto the agenda.  
 
5  Studying women’s empowerment and 
 accountability for women’s rights in 
 fragile and conflict-affected settings: some 
 methodological considerations 
The challenges of studying women’s empowerment and accountability to women’s rights in 
fragile and conflict-affected settings are not just logistical or methodological. They include 
the challenge of framing questions in such a way that assumptions that accompany 
representations of women in these settings do not occlude the researchers’ capacity to make 
sense of the complex realities of women’s lives and their interactions with the various 
authorities, statutory and non-statutory, that constitute the institutions significant to them in 
their everyday lives.  
 
A host of gender myths and essentialisms are invoked to describe women’s lives and issues 
in these settings, including that women are inherently more peaceful than men and are 
‘natural’ peacemakers (El-Bushra 2007). That women may gain opportunities from situations 
of conflict, especially where they have the capacity to trade across opposing sides or gain 
economic advantage from shortage and uncertainty, is often not part of the story of women 
in situations of conflict. And we just need to look at the post-conflict settlements brokered in 
countries like Iraq and Rwanda to see how, formally at least, women can gain opportunities 
for accelerated access to political office. Conflict and fragility may be seen as disruptions in 
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gender regimes that create openings for women to seek and gain power. Being open to 
recognising and understanding where opportunities for influence emerge is therefore 
important. This includes an openness to exploring forms of social and political action that 
come out of, and work within, unorthodox sites and spaces.  
 
Understanding the complex landscape of social and political action also calls for approaches 
that can situate actors, networks and spaces on a larger canvas that spans beyond 
particular country sites. These maps of entry points for social and political action need to 
include multiple locales, within, beyond, and beneath that of the nation-state. It also needs to 
include a host of non-formal institutions, from the plurality of informal institutions that play 
such an important part in mediating women’s experiences, to private sector actors of various 
kinds, to the myriad development actors that exist in each of the case study contexts, to the 
complex and differentiated institutions of the local and national state, to external actors as 
diverse as UN agencies, foreign NGOs and external investors. In the cases considered here, 
a key factor that is common to them all is the significance of global policy frameworks, 
regional mechanisms and international agreements. Perceptual maps of institutions, entry 
points and tactics drawn by different kinds of social and political actors might be an 
interesting way to explore the interplay between global and local forces, and the gathering of 
stories of change that illustrate this dynamic might be very fruitful as a mode of enquiry.  
 
Emerging from these cases, and especially from the second set of cases from Brazil and 
South Africa, is the significance of well-qualified, skilled legal advocates who can make and 
mobilise claims, as well as of mature organisations that have the institutional capacity to 
provide effective advocacy as well as to offer front-line support. Mapping opportunities for 
the education and training of female lawyers and gaining a sense, through institutional 
biographies of key women’s movements and organisations, of their organisational 
development, can provide important insights into avenues for future support.  
 
As noted earlier, a key insight is the critical role that is played by gate openers and other 
allies within the executive branch of government, even where the legislative and the judiciary 
remains a hostile space for women’s rights and accountability to women (Annesley 2010). 
Narrative biographies of key gate openers would be a fascinating way to explore the political 
dynamics of what’s worked and what obstacles have been placed in the paths of social and 
political actors – and how they have overcome them. This mode of enquiry, one that begins 
with individual actors’ own experiences and invites them into an extended autobiographical 
narrative in which the researcher acts as facilitator of story-telling rather than question-asker, 
can be an excellent way to navigate sensitivities, creating a reflective space for the 
interviewee that is often a valuable pause for thought that can be richly productive. 
Biographies of processes of change can also provide a focus for open-ended interviews that 
begin, again, with a story of change rather than with a set of questions. Done visually or 
through verbal story-telling, this can reveal key moments, uncover key junctures, and make 
visible key actors. Sequencing biographical narratives with institutional maps can be a way 
to get a better understanding of actor-networks, and of the complexity of dynamics of 
processes of social and political action.   
 
One of the most powerfully evident insights from the cases considered here, which 
resonates with a wider literature – including that generated by the largest international 
association of women’s organisations and movements, the Association for Women’s Rights 
in Development (AWID) (www.awid.org), the findings from the Pathways project 
(www.pathways-of-empowerment.org), and many other sources, including the large-scale 
studies of Htun and Weldon – is that the strength of feminist and women’s movements is a 
vital factor in women’s empowerment and accountability to women. Shifts in funding and the 
rise of NGOisation (Alvarez 2009; Jad 2004) have weakened movements. Critical to 
understanding women’s empowerment and accountability to women in conflict-affected and 
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fragile settings is an understanding of what has assisted and what has detracted from the 
effectiveness of women’s and feminist movements and organisations in these settings.  
 
There are many participatory methods that can be used very productively in this kind of 
enquiry, from time trends diagrams to interactive timelines to force-field analysis. One of the 
attractions of participatory methods is that they offer the possibility of collective analysis, 
bringing a number of social and political actors together to analyse the field of action in 
which they have been engaged. This can generate a rich picture from which to draw insights 
about what works and what has served as obstacles to realising women’s rights and 
advancing accountability to women. 
 
 
6  Conclusion 
What wider lessons do these cases offer for the analysis of social and political action for 
empowerment and accountability? One is the importance of paying close attention not only 
to context, but to temporality: to understanding the political landscape in which social and 
political actors operate not as a static field of action, but to capture the dynamism of the 
interplay between those social political actors as situated spatially and temporally, in a 
particular place and as products of a particular historical moment. This is especially 
important in conflict-affected contexts, where interactions and alignments between actors 
and institutions can shift rapidly and unexpectedly, with sometimes dramatic effects.  
 
What remains outside the frame for this paper, but is in some ways the most significant 
arena for women’s empowerment is women’s economic empowerment. One of the arenas of 
contradiction in the current conjuncture is precisely that of the economic, and the 
intersections between economic power and empowerment and political mobilisation and 
voice is an area that is rich for future exploration. One unresolved question is whether 
economic empowerment strategies in fragile and conflict-affected settings facilitate or 
undermine women’s social and political action. There is as yet insufficient evidence to know, 
for example, whether by introducing initiatives such as entrepreneurship programmes, 
external actors are stimulating or defusing such action. These are fruitful areas for future 
research, especially research that traces women’s agency across spaces and sites of 
engagement in a way that can foreground some of the intersectional dimensions of power 
and constraint.  
 
In this paper, I’ve sought to apply a version of conjunctural analysis to understanding the 
trajectories of change in the four case study settings. In conclusion, I’d like to draw out some 
of the elements of this form of analysis. Conjunctural analysis can aid the analysis of social 
and political action for empowerment and accountability, by teasing apart the constellation of 
actors and discourses that constitute the current moment, and their diverse temporalities, as 
well as the critical frictions and fissions that offer the cracks in hegemony with which social 
and political actors can fruitfully work. It provides a lens that allows us to explore critical 
junctures where the alignment of particular strategies and tactics and particular actors was 
able to produce politically meaningful gains. Understanding the dynamics of change in the 
terms offered by conjunctural analysis provides not only a closer reading of dynamics 
between different kinds of social and political actors. It also allows us to identify opportunities 
captured in what Gramsci (1976) called ‘strategic horizons of action’. Hall, Massey and 
Rustin posit that the concept of conjuncture can,  
 
expand the capacity to act politically by helping to examine the conditions of a political 
intervention in their complexity, that is, to trade the displacements and condensations 
of different sorts of contradictions, and thus open up possibilities for action.  
(Hall et al. 2013) 
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Understanding the ‘conditions of a (social and) political intervention in their complexity’ can, 
as Hall et al. suggest, provide us with insights into how change happens, as well as what 
needs to change.  
 
Women’s political representation and violence against women and girls are amongst the top 
priorities for international development actors internationally, and figure significantly in the 
Sustainable Development Goals. In fragile and conflict-affected settings both offer important 
entry points to address the realisation of women’s rights. By seeking to ask questions not 
only about what has happened but also what has worked and what can work in future to 
support positive change in favour of women’s empowerment and accountability to women, 
and grounding these questions in the conjuncture paying close attention to the contingencies 
of women’s identities and struggles, such research can make a positive contribution to 
making change happen.   
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